Stage Five: Postmortem Election Analysis Through the Lens of Simulation
In this sequel of sorts to the Stage Four series, we address a phenomenon of modern media when it no longer takes itself seriously but asks you to do so, or else.
We could spill lots of digital ink over the 2026 US midterm election. In broad terms, it is not difficult to understand (from a sociopolitical perspective) what happened: people were upset with the party in power over large swaths of the country and chose "something different." More granularly, I think one US political party misread its 2024 electoral mandate of addressing serious economic issues as "brutalize people and let weird groypers govern by right-wing grievance," but no matter how much they seem mystified by the fact that most of America does not share their interest in based memes and the number "1488," we cannot lay the failure of the modern right solely at the unwashed feet of weird nerds who can't get laid. Instead, we need to look at the media-owning class (who I argued in Part II was really the ones attempting to shape the narrative) and their reaction.
Stage Five: Parody, or, how Trump won the election he lost
While the returns were still settling, the New York Times opinion page ran a column by Michelle Cottle under the headline "Trump Has the Democrats Right Where He Wants Them."
Read that headline again. The president's party has just been routed. By the column's own account, the voters have handed Congress to the opposition. And the paper of record's response is to tell its readers that this is what the loser wanted. Cottle grants that most Republicans woke up miserable. Trump didn't, she says. She imagines him greeting the morning with something close to glee, because two years of open war with a Democratic Congress is his idea of paradise. The defeat, she concludes, was the outcome he'd been hoping for: "a Democratic win was surely what he was rooting for all along."
It is tempting, as certain humor accounts online are wont to do, to chalk this up to the NYT being its usual stupid self, and we should do that, but just because someone is being ridiculous does not also meant we must assume that is all it is. I want to take this column seriously. Its argument isn't persuasive, and as we'll see, it isn't trying to be. But it's a nearly perfect specimen of something this series has been circling since its first installment. I have been describing Trump, and the media ecosystem that digests him, as a fourth-stage phenomenon in Baudrillard's sense: a sign with no relation to any reality whatsoever. I now think that's incomplete. There is a further stage, one Baudrillard didn't name and perhaps couldn't have. It needed thirty years of cable news, a decade of Trump, and a fully grown online economy of "takes" before it could exist. I'm going to call it parody. It is the sign that has left behind even the nominal tether of simulation, and that reattaches itself to its subject only as an ironic instrument for shaping narrative.

The Four Phases, Briefly
For readers just arriving: "The Precession of Simulacra," the opening essay of Simulacra and Simulation (1981), lays out four successive phases of the image. In the first, the image reflects a profound reality. It is a good copy, the portrait that looks like its sitter. In the second, it masks and denatures that reality. It is a bad copy: propaganda, the flattering lie. But it is still a lie that presupposes a truth it is lying about. In the third, it masks the absence of any profound reality, posing as the copy of an original that isn't there. Baudrillard's example is Disneyland, which presents itself as imaginary so that the rest of Los Angeles can go on believing it is real. In the fourth, the image bears no relation to any reality at all. It is, in his phrase, "its own pure simulacrum."
Across the four phases the tether loosens step by step. In the first the sign is bound to the real. In the second it strains against the binding. In the third it hides that the binding has been cut. In the fourth it no longer remembers there was anything to be bound to. Signs refer to other signs, the map precedes the territory, and then the territory rots away beneath it.
Trump fit this schema almost too well. He was a billionaire who was really a licensing brand. He was a dealmaker whose deals were a television show, and a strongman whose strength consisted in being seen to be strong. By 2016 there was no Trump-in-himself behind the Trump-image for the image to misrepresent. You couldn't fact-check him into a stage-two liar, because there was no stable claim for the check to grip. That, roughly, is where this series began, and I still think it's right as far as it goes.

A Column That Doesn't Believe Itself
What's striking about the Cottle piece is not that it's wrong. It's that it so plainly knows it's wrong. It says so paragraph by paragraph while the headline goes on asserting the opposite.
Consider the evidence the column itself assembles. Trump, she notes, is a sore loser, the kind who answered his last defeat with January 6th. He spent the campaign trying to tilt the field toward his own party. In the closing months he begged his followers to vote as though his own name were on the ballot. His standard pitch to Republican voters was a warning: let the Democrats win and they'll come after him again, maybe impeach him a third time. Every one of these facts describes a man who badly wanted to win and feared what losing would cost him. The column lays them all out. Then, on the strength of nothing, it announces that underneath it all he wanted to lose.
Nor does the column believe its own forecast. Cottle predicts that Trump will blame every failure on the new majorities. Then she immediately says the strategy probably won't work beyond his base, because voters blame presidents for what happens on their watch and more and more of them have stopped buying the act. She cheers on the incoming committee chairs. She calls his second-term record a flop and the closing years of his presidency a slog. By the final paragraph, the man supposedly holding all the cards is a lame duck wallowing in chaos, which is exactly how you would describe someone who has lost.
Then look at the verbs that carry the headline's thesis. She suspects. He probably tells himself. In his mind. Surely. The central claim of the column is never reported or argued. It is conjectured: a speculative account of an inner life the author can't see and, judging by the rest of the piece, doesn't really believe in. The headline is not a conclusion drawn from the column's evidence. It is a frame laid over that evidence, contradicted by it, and left standing anyway.
This is the important part. A stage-two distortion wants you to believe the lie. A stage-four simulacrum doesn't care whether you believe it, because belief is beside the point. This column does something else. It asks you to entertain a claim that neither the writer, nor the reader, nor (on the column's own evidence) the president actually holds, and it asks with a wink. It's a bit. The headline is a joke the column tells, and Trump is both its subject and its ventriloquist's dummy.
You may ask why this matters. As I argued in Part I, the media matters because it shapes the fundamental, value-and-meaning-giving context of the Umwelt we inhabit. Nothing we do makes sense, or acquires meaning, or has a purpose apart from the narrative we tell ourselves about what we're doing and why we're doing that. In that regard, I argued, our media apparatus both performs a necessary function and then promptly fails at it because it has now eroded the cognitive infrastructure necessary for the epistemological project of self-governance. And in Part II, I argued that we need to create forms of knowledge production and distribution sufficiently structurally different to overcome that failure. Part III invited us all to place in that project, and that is why this is not Stage Four, Part IV. This is Stage Five, because the media apparatus, faced with the contradictions I laid out, decided to ask you to see the naked emperor and play along anyway, not because of some idiopathic attachment to structure or institutions or some other metanarrative substitute, but because they no longer bother to treat you with the respect necessary to ask you to take them seriously while displaying how deadly serious it all is.

Why This Isn't Stage Four
It would be easy to file this under stage four and move on: another sign floating free of its referent, another fragment of the hyperreal. But the fit is wrong, and the way it's wrong is what shows Baudrillard's analysis was incomplete, as he did not have the full data of this late-stage modernity.
The pure simulacrum doesn't need the real. That's what makes it pure. It doesn't refer to the world even to distort it. It refers to other signs, and its coherence is internal. The Trump brand in its stage-four form, the gold towers and the reality-show boardroom, never had to argue with facts, because it never traded in facts at all.
The Cottle column needs the real badly. It needs the election to have happened, and to have gone the way it went. The whole conceit depends on an actual, verifiable, lopsided defeat. Without the loss there's no joke. Its relation to its referent isn't absence. It's a kind of ironic custody. It picks the real up, holds it at arm's length, turns it upside down, and presents the inversion as the more sophisticated reading. The tether to reality that was cut in stage four has been knotted back on, but only so the sign can be swung by it.
To be fair, Baudrillard himself did go past four. In The Transparency of Evil (1990) he proposed a "fractal" stage of value, after the natural, commercial, and structural stages. Here value no longer follows any law of equivalence. It metastasizes and radiates in every direction at once, like a virus. That describes most of social media better than most accounts do, and it's tempting to call the Cottle column one more bit of fractal proliferation: a take that spawns counter-takes and signifies in all directions. But fractal value is indifferent. It spreads without aim. Parody has an aim. It is directional, and it is directed at a narrative outcome. Parody wants you to laugh, but it wants the laugh to be pointed.
Nor is this what Fredric Jameson called pastiche. For Jameson, postmodern culture had replaced parody with pastiche, imitation without the satirical impulse, "blank parody." Pastiche arose because there was no longer any norm against which imitation could register as mockery. Pastiche is the characteristic mode of stages three and four: style without an original. What I'm describing brings back the satirical structure that pastiche emptied out. The knowing distance, the ironic inversion, and the wink at an audience assumed to be in on it all return. But they serve a purpose satire never had. Satire mocks power in order to diminish it. This parody mocks the real in order to manage it.
Stage Five: Parody
So, a provisional definition. In the fifth stage, the sign has dropped even the pretense of simulation. It doesn't claim to copy the real, faithfully or otherwise. It doesn't hide the real's absence. It doesn't float free of the real in self-referential autonomy. Instead it returns to the real, knowingly and ironically, and attaches itself as an instrument for shaping how the real will be narrated. Its author doesn't believe it, its audience isn't expected to believe it, and it isn't meant to describe its subject. Its truth value is irrelevant. Its story value is everything. It prescribes and directs action without requiring doxastic commitment, and thus, it both raises the practical stakes and lowers the ideological ones. It does not matter in the grand Hegelian march of ideological history. It does not matter in the Marxist material sense. All that matters is its power to dominante you and shape your narrative reality, untethered from any other concern. It refuses the dialectic.
All four of Baudrillard's phases are, one way or another, about representation: the relation between an image and what it's an image of. The fifth isn't about representation at all. It's about positioning. The question it answers isn't "what is the case?" or even "what can be made to seem the case?" It is "whose story is this going to be?"
The Cottle column answers that question precisely. A midterm in which tens of millions of voters repudiated the president's party is, on its face, the electorate's story. Or it's the Democrats' story, or at the very least the Republicans'. The column makes it Trump's. Losing becomes a move. The repudiation becomes a gift he secretly wanted. Before a single subpoena has been issued, the next two years are pre-scripted as the arena where he is most at home. The voters acted, and the column takes their act and hands it back, gift-wrapped, to the man they acted against.
Notice that this works whether or not anyone believes it. That is the genius of the form, and its menace. Belief isn't the mechanism; attention is. You don't have to accept that Trump wanted to lose. You only have to spend six and a half minutes thinking about Trump's psychology on the morning after the electorate had its say about everything else. The narrative has been shaped at the level of what the story is about, and that level sits beneath any argument over whether the story is true or how it should affect you.
The Heel's Promo
There's an obvious analogy, and Trump of all people would appreciate it. He's in the WWE Hall of Fame. He shaved Vince McMahon's head at WrestleMania 23. Professional wrestling runs on kayfabe, the convention of presenting staged events as real. Classic kayfabe is something like stage two: the performers know the matches are fixed, and the audience is supposed not to. Then in 1989 McMahon told New Jersey regulators that wrestling was entertainment, not sport. After that, the business drifted into something like stages three and four. Everyone knew, nobody cared, and the storylines became their own self-sufficient reality, signs pointing at signs.
But there's a later, stranger mode. Here the storylines start absorbing real events, such as a real injury, a real contract dispute, or a real backstage feud, and turning them into angles. The real is pulled into the work, ironically and knowingly, and the audience is invited to admire the craft of the absorption. That's the fifth stage. The real event isn't hidden or replaced. It's booked.
Seen this way, the Cottle column is a heel promo, cut on Trump's behalf by someone who doesn't like him. The heel lost the match, cleanly, in front of everyone. Then the commentator steps up to explain to the crowd that this was all part of the heel's plan, that losing is when he's most dangerous, that the real feud starts now. It's the oldest move in the business: when your guy loses, you book the loss as a setup. What's striking is that nobody had to pay the commentator to say it. The press has absorbed the booker's sensibility so completely that it now writes the angle unprompted, for a performer it claims to despise.
Jay Rosen's name for the underlying disposition is "the cult of the savvy": the political journalist's preference for being knowing about the game over being right about the world. The savvy take's highest value is seeing through things, and the most sophisticated way to see through a defeat is to reveal it as a victory in disguise. Savviness is the moral psychology of stage five. It can't let a plain fact stay plain, because plainness would mean the columnist knows nothing the reader doesn't.

What the Vote Costs
The second installment of this series was called "What the Map Costs." Stage five has its own price, and the people whose actions are being parodied are the ones who pay it.
An election is one of the few remaining occasions when a democratic public gets to issue a sign with a fixed meaning. Whatever else it does, a vote says yes or no. In the ordinary grammar of democratic politics, a midterm wipeout of the president's party means no: a rebuke, a check, a demand for something different. That meaning is the whole point. It's what makes the act worth performing.
The fifth-stage column takes that sign and declares it unreadable, or rather readable only as its opposite. If winning is winning and losing is secretly also winning, then no outcome can register as defeat. The political will of the masses, expressed as a historic victory for the opposition party not seen since the post-Watergate election, is effectively nullified. "You fool, you fucking idiot fool," the wise commentator tells us, "you've done exactly what I wanted you to do."
And what's more, one of the most "trusted" (for various meanings of that term) media outlets published it, under a byline, with its imprimatur, in such a way that requires us to take it seriously even as we dismiss it for being facile and, well, fucking stupid. Because like it or not, the NYT is a mouthpiece and gets to speak, in ways that reach far beyond this poor blog which will be read, if current trends are any indication, by a dozen or so of you. Allowing myself a little vanity, I think a piece like this, accurately describing the con being foisted on the public, is at least as important as Cottle's column to which it responds. But I am not going to get a byline in the Times and a headshot to go with it. More is the pity.
Because a sign that can't mean "no" can't mean anything. The voters thought they were speaking. The column tells them they were actually handing their opponent exactly what he wanted. The rebuke becomes a tribute before the ink is dry.
Baudrillard's reading of Watergate is useful here, if only in reverse. Watergate, he argued, served to revive a moral principle that no longer governed anything. The scandal was staged as a scandal so that the system around it could be believed to be clean. The scandal effect brought back a phantom of the real. Stage five runs the operation backward. Watergate staged a scandal to resurrect the real; this column stages a defeat to abolish it. A real event, unambiguous and consequential, is ironized until it no longer counts as having happened the way it happened.
The same logic reaches the oversight the new Congress will actually carry out. Under this frame, every subpoena, contempt citation, and hearing is pre-coded as the president's entertainment, the brawl he has always wanted. Accountability becomes content. If he stonewalls, that's the show. If he's held in contempt, that's the show too. The opposition's institutional power is narrated in advance as a supporting role in his spectacle. That isn't an analysis of what will happen. It's a bid to decide what whatever happens will mean.

Coda: Refusing the Booking
I don't think the Cottle column is malicious; I don't think she's that smart. I think it's habitual. It expresses a professional reflex trained over ten years, during which putting Trump at the center of every story has been the single most reliable way to get read. That is what makes the fifth stage more dangerous than the fourth. The pure simulacrum is, in its way, inert: it floats free and asks nothing of us. Parody reaches back down and grips the real. It needs our elections, our wars, our hearings, and our votes, so that it can turn them into material.
The answer to stage four was always hard to find, because there was nothing to fact-check. Oddly, stage five gives us more to work with. The real is right there in the column, contradicting the headline paragraph by paragraph. The answer isn't a counter-narrative, which would just be another bid for the booking. It's refusing to accept that the event needs to be booked at all. The voters said no. It meant no. It doesn't have to be about him. But opinion pieces do not exist in a vacuum. Nor do elections. Or anything, really. They're all component elements in a story we are telling, and what the media apparatus wants is us as audience with no will and no desire to participate in the telling of the story. That is primarily what I want you to resist, and I do not appreciate you being made the butt of a joke while I am exhorting you to take control of your role in the story. Maybe that is why I am compelled to write these things. Maybe it is why I paradoxically hope you will listen to me and not her. Because one of us wants you for an audience. The other wants you as a comrade.